The main aim of this article is analysing the use of precedent made by the Italian Constitutional Court and its effectiveness in the light of Michele Taruffo's 'dimensions' of the precedents.
It is often said that, as in other civil law systems, precedents in the Italian legal system are not legally binding, as they are simply persuasive (in other words, they affect the legal reasoning of judgments only de facto) 2 .
For this reason, at a first glance, this topic would not deserve much attention by lawyers.
However, it does, at least for three reasons.
First, precedent, although not legally binding, affects de facto the legal reasoning underpinning judgments. This is the main reason why it is worth studying their role: the way the Italian courts carry out their every-day legal reasoning is affected (even if only de facto) by precedents.
Secondly, it is worth studying the specific dimensions in the light of which precedents affect the legal reasoning of the courts in the Italian system, in order to understand how persuasive the precedent actually is there.
As Michele Taruffo has shown in his studies 3 , beyond the traditional dichotomy (legally binding precedent in common law system/persuasive precedent in civil law systems), in both the common law system and the civil law system, the actual role of precedent in a jurisdiction depends on some specific dimensions, such as:
-an 'institutional dimension', i.e. the existence of more than one Supreme Court (like the Italian Corte di Cassazione and Consiglio di Stato) and/or the existence of a Constitutional Court (not in a hierarchical relation with the other courts) in the jurisdiction concerned 4 . The higher the quantity of Supreme Courts established in a jurisdiction, the higher the quantity of sources of potentially opposing precedents coexists there.
-an 'objective dimension', i.e. the way in which the precedent is framed (with regard to the ratio decidendi or to the regula juris, as will be explained later), the way in which the precedent is published (by reporting or by the massimazione, as will be seen later) 5 and the overall number of judgments issued by the Supreme Court (the more numerous the judgments issued by a Supreme Court, the more potentially contradictory precedents might occur) 6 .
-a 'structural dimension', i.e. the way in which the precedent is identified as such 7 . One should bear in mind that strictly speaking what creates a precedent in the common law is the ratio decidendi of one previous decision 8 . In the Italian legal system, the thing which is persuasive and affects legal reasoning is not the ratio decidendi of one previous decision, but the giurisprudenza costante, which is a group of past judgments with the same constant underpinning regula juris. Clearly, the higher the quantity of judgments required to make a precedent, the higher the risk is of contradictory judgments and the higher the difficulty there is to work out when a case counts as a precedent.
-an 'effectiveness dimension', i.e. the degree of the binding force of the precedent, which can vary within common law jurisdictions too 9 .
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Thirdly, some distinguished Italian academics stated that precedents in Italian system played a legal role, i.e. their force derives from legal provisions or principles of law 10 .
Their opinion is not shared by the rest of the academia 11 . However, some pieces of legislation and some cases have recently expressly recognised the role of precedents at least with regards to some specific circumstances. These pieces of legislation and cases will be described here.
All that said, one of the aims of the article is examining whether such express recognitions of the role of the precedent are effective in the light of the dimensions mentioned above. In other words, one of the purposes of this article is in analysing, in the light of the dimensions mentioned above, how effective precedent is in the Italian legal system, under legislation and case-law which expressly recognise the role of the precedent.
Actually, as the use of precedent made by the Corte di cassazione has already been studied in depth (especially by Michele Taruffo), the main scope of the article, after describing Taruffo's analysis 12 , will be analysing the use of precedent made by the Italian Constitutional Court. On the one hand, the approach of the Corte costituzionale towards its own decisions will be examined, in order to test its effectiveness in the Italian legal order in the light of the dimensions set by Taruffo 13 ; on the other hand, the role of precedent of two other courts (the Corte di cassazione and the European Court of Human Rights), as used by the Corte costituzionale itself in its jurisprudence will be examined, so as to see
whether and to what extent the Corte costituzionale considers the precedent of these two courts 14 .
So as to understand better the actual role played by precedent in the Italian legal system, it is now time to describe the tasks of the Italian Supreme Court and of the Italian Constitutional Court 15 .
The Corte di cassazione
In English when we speak of 'the Judiciary' or 'judicial power' (in Italian: potere giudiziario), we refer to the entire system of the courts that interpret and apply the law.
This name is usually used from the perspective of the separation of powers. The Corte di cassazione is a giudice di legittimità (in other words it scrutinises whether the judgments of the lower courts have been issued in compliance with legislation) and not a giudice di merito like the lower courts, which decide on the merits of each case.
When a judgment of a lower court is in violation of the law, the Court of Cassation can declare it void (cassare). The Court of Cassation is not allowed to decide itself on the merits of the case. The annulment can be of two kinds: without a referral to (senza rinvio)
or with a referral to the lower court (con rinvio). The annulment without a referral is issued when the lower court was not responsible for issuing that judgment; whereas the annulment with a referral is issued when the lower court was responsible for issuing that judgment but it did so in violation of the law. In the latter, the proceedings can be started again before the lower court which must avoid violating the law again. 
The Corte costituzionale
The task of the Corte costituzionale is to carry out constitutional judicial review.
In Italy constitutional judicial review is carried out by a single and specialized Court is to say that it does not arise from a concrete case brought before a Court.
In the light of the current analysis of the role of the precedent in the Italian legal system, it is also important to bear in mind that the judgments of the Corte costituzionale are based on:
-the oggetto: the object whose validity is scrutinized by the Court (e.g. Acts of -the motivi: other legal or non legal factors which influence the judgments (e.g. the tertium comparationis which is used when the scrutiny on the respect of the principle of equality is carried out).
The Analysis of the Precedent in the Italian Legal System Carried Out by Michele Taruffo

The Features of the Precedent in the Italian Legal System
It is now time to focus on the features of precedent in the Italian system.
Before doing this, it is worth reminding ourselves the main features of precedent in the common law system.
First, the concept of precedent in the common law system is one of the sources of the law, beside the statutes 21 .
Secondly, as already mentioned, a single decision of a court on a matter of law can be taken into account as a precedent.
Thirdly, not every legal observation which is stated by a court can be taken into account as a precedent. Only the ratio decidendi (literally: the rationale behind the decision) creates a precedent. Other legal propositions in a judgment are considered merely as obiter dicta
The ratio decidendi is the proposition of law concerning the material facts of the case, on which implicitly or expressly the court has framed their judgment. The ratio decidendi is not something abstract: it is the rule concerning the material facts concerning the concrete case.
Therefore, when a judgment has been issued, any subsequent court will frame the precedent with regards to the material facts of the previous case and will apply it to their own judgment only if those material facts do not have any reasonable legal distinction 22 .
Fourthly, when it is said that the precedent is legally binding (i. In other words, the rule of the stare decisis legally binds the legal reasoning of any subsequent court 23 .
When any subsequent court states that a reasonable legal distinction occurs in the case brought before them, this is the case of a distinction made by the court: strictly speaking this is not an exception to the rule of the stare decisis as there is no analogy between those two cases. However, the rule clearly affects the legal reasoning of any subsequent court anyway, as the court must explain why those two cases are different from one another.
The only exception to the rule of the stare decisis is an overruling, that is when a court does not follow a precedent (in other words it does not apply a previous ratio decidendi notwithstanding the analogy between the two controversies All that said, it is now time to explain the features of the precedent in the Italian legal system.
First, precedents in the civil law system are not considered to be sources of the law.
Sources of the law are only: Constitution; Acts of Parliament; some decrees of the Executive which are primary legislation; regolamenti (a sort of statutory instruments); customs 25 .
Secondly, as already mentioned, what affects legal reasoning is the giurisprudenza costante, which is not one precedent but it is a group of past judgments with the same constant underpinning ratio decidendi 26 .
Thirdly, it is not entirely correct to speak of ratio decidendi itself in our system as it is hard to identify a ratio decidendi in past judgments, in the sense this concept is used in the common law world (where, as said, the ratio decidendi is the proposition of law concerning the material facts of the concrete case, on which implicitly or expressly the court has framed their judgment). In the Italian system, the precedent is made by the abstract proposition of law which can be extracted from a group of past judgments. I would call it regula juris, instead of ratio decidendi.
Therefore, any subsequent courts will base their decisions on the abstract proposition of law extracted from the giurisprudenza only when they successfully argue that the material facts concerning the case brought before it, can be regulated by that same abstract proposition of law.
At the end of the day, in the common law system such a court compares material facts and applies the precedent to the controversy before itself only if those material facts do not have any reasonable legal distinction; whereas in the civil law system any subsequent courts follow the giurisprudenza only when they argue that the material facts can be regulated by the same abstract proposition of law that can be extracted from the giurisprudenza itself 27 .
Fourthly, as already said, the giurisprudenza is not legally binding. The giurisprudenza of domestic court is simply persuasive. It affects the legal reasoning governing subsequent judgments (i.e. when the subsequent court decides to deviate from the giurisprudenza, it has to explain in depth the reasons why it does so) but only de facto 28 .
As the Italian Court of Cassation stated in 2014 29 the safeguarding of the unity and the stability of the interpretation of the law (especially the one given by the Court of Cassation and by the united chambers in it) is to be considered 'alla stregua di un criterio legale di interpretazione delle norme giuridiche' (i.e. a legal criterion of interpretation), especially after the amendment of article 374 c. In the same judgment the Court of Cassation also underlined that the courts play an important role in making the law flexible in a legal order. However, this could be problematic in the light of the unity and the stability of the interpretation of the law when a lower court overrules a precedent (literally, in Italian: 'precedente') of the Court of Cassation. This is even more problematic when the precedent is recent. Therefore, lower courts should act responsibly in interpreting the law. This does not mean that courts should avoid overruling or should only overrule for the future. This means that courts have to look carefully to ensure that there are good reasons to overrule. There is no mathematical formula for this. It is a matter of responsibility.
As the Court of Cassation stated in 2015, in our system the rule of the stare decisis does not exist. However, when they overrule, the following courts have to explain the reasoning behind the overruling 30 .
These are the reasons why the word 'precedent', strictly speaking, does not fit into the civil law system 31 .
How Persuasive is the precedent in the Italian legal system?
At the end of the day, in both common law and civil law jurisdictions, precedents affect the legal reasoning behind any subsequent judgments, as in both systems the subsequent court has to explain why it deviates from the precedent. As already seen, following Michele Taruffo's analysis, beside the dichotomy between legally binding/persuasive precedents, the actual role of the precedent in each legal system depends on the role played by the aforementioned dimensions.
All that said, it is now worth analysing how persuasive precedent is in the Italian system in the light of the first three dimensions pointed out by Taruffo. The fourth dimension (which concerns the degree of the binding force of precedents) seems to be a sort of general key which summarises the nature of precedents in the common law and civil law jurisdictions.
(i) The first dimension to be analysed is the institutional one. Revista (ii) Secondly, there is an objective dimension: it concerns the boundaries of what constitutes a precedent.
As said, in the common law system the ratio decidendi (the proposition of law concerning the material facts of the controversy) constitutes the precedent. In the Italian system we tend to refer to the regula juris which can be extracted from the giurisprudenza (the abstract proposition of law which can be extracted from a group of past judgments).
This is perhaps a consequence of the different way Judges are used to dealing with cases in the two systems: on the one hand, Judges in civil law systems are used to dealing with abstract and general statutory provisions to apply to material facts; on the other hand, Judges in the common law system are used to dealing with material facts to be solved via propositions of case law concerning material facts.
However, as far as Italy is concerned, it is worth mentioning two elements which makes the effectiveness of the precedents of the Court of Cassation rather weak. Revista This system leads to the creation of a paradox. Massime are extracted from all the judgments of the Court of Cassation as such, regardless of their value or not as precedents.
In doing so, no attention is paid to the distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter dicta 34 .
(iii) Thirdly, the structural dimension concerns the number of judgments needed to have a precedent. As already said, in the common law system one judgment is enough to create a precedent. In the civil law system, the giurisprudenza arises from a group of past judgments with the same constant regula juris.
Clearly, as the number of judgments to be taken into account as to extract the giurisprudenza is higher, this is hard work because judgments, even of the Court of Cassation itself, are often in contradiction one another and it is not so easy to understand when a giurisprudenza is costante, i.e. with the same constant underpinning regula juris.
Taruffo calls this caos giurisprudenziale (chaotic jurisprudence) 35 .
At the end of the day, due to these dimensions, it is clear that the persuasive strength of precedents of the Corte di cassazione in the Italian legal system is rather weak. The aim of this amendment was clearly to protect the unity of the giurisprudenza of the United Chambers of the Court of Cassation. However, no sanction has been set if the chamber does not refer the decision to the United Chambers. This provision is basically ineffective 38 .
The Express Recognitions of the Persuasive Role of the Precedent of the
(ii) Secondly, article 360-bis, n. 1, codice di procedura civile (the code of the proceedings before civil courts), as amended in 2009.
This new article reads as follows: a challenge before the Corte di cassazione against a judgment is inadmissible, when the decision on matters of law in that judgment is based on the giurisprudenza of the Corte di cassazione and the claimant does not introduce any element which could lead to an overruling of that giurisprudenza 39 .
The aim of this amendment was clearly to 'protect' the unity of the giurisprudenza of the Court of Cassation. However, the giurisprudenza in our system is hard to identify, due to the way the three dimensions are shaped in the Italian legal systems, and this makes it hard for the Corte di cassazione itself to declare a challenge inadmissible on those grounds set out in article 360-bis, n. However, as the precedent in the Italian legal system is so difficult to identify, due to the three dimensions already analysed, its persuasive role is weak, also with regards to those circumstances set out in these provisions.
The Use of Precedent Made by the Corte costituzionale
The use of precedent made by the Corte di cassazione has been already studied in depth, especially by Michele Taruffo. Therefore, as already said, the main scope of this article is analysing the use of precedent made by the Italian Constitutional Court: on the one hand, it will be examined the role of precedent of the Corte costituzionale towards itself, as to test the grade of its effectiveness in the Italian legal order in the light of the dimensions set by 
The Highly 'Political' Role of the Corte costituzionale and the Need for a Strict Legal Reasoning when it Overrules
The general features already seen with regards to the precedent in the Italian legal system in general, can be found in the precedent of the Corte costituzionale.
First, precedents of the Corte costituzionale are not considered to be sources of the law, as from this perspective the nature of the judgments of the Corte costituzionale does not differ from the judgments of the other courts 44 .
Secondly, it is worth mentioning that also with regards to the Corte costituzionale the concept of ratio decidendi hardly fits.
As already said, the ratio decidendi is the proposition of law concerning the material facts of the controversy, on which implicitly or expressly the court has framed their judgment. However, the judgments of the Corte costituzionale do not refer to material facts. As already said, they refer to the constitutionality of a piece of primary legislation and they are based on the oggetto, the parametro and the motivi. All these elements are not material facts. Therefore, the concept of ratio decidendi in its strict meaning does not fit with the nature itself of the judgments of the Corte costituzionale 45 . Once again, strictly speaking, we can only speak of regula juris instead of ratio decidendi with regards to the
Corte costituzionale.
Thirdly, the giurisprudenza of the Corte costituzionale does not legally bind the Corte itself. The giurisprudenza is simply persuasive. It affects the legal reasoning governing its subsequent judgments (i.e. when the Corte costituzionale decides to deviate from its past precedent, it has to explain in depth the reasons why it does so) but only de facto.
However, if we look at the dimensions set by Taruffo, the strength of the precedents of the Corte costituzionale towards itself is stronger than that of the Corte di cassazione. From the perspective of the 'objective dimension' and of the 'structural dimension', the small number of judgments issued by the Corte costituzionale (around 300 judgments per year) and the small number of Judges in the Corte itself (15 Judges, appointed for 9 years) avoids potential contradictory precedents.
All that said, one should bear in mind another important feature of the Corte costituzionale, perhaps even more crucial. For the Corte costituzionale there is always the risk of being seen as a kind of political actor, as the issues concerned are of the highest 'political' nature (i.e. they concern the constitutionality of statutes and acts of the main constitutional bodies of the State). Therefore, any overruling by the Corte costituzionale might run the risk of being seen as a purely political choice.
To avoid this, when the Corte costituzionale overrules its own giurisprudenza, its legal reasoning has to be even more strict than the legal reasoning of other courts, as to be legitimate in the eyes of the public opinion 46 .
Once again, this is not a matter of a legally binding duty but something which is rooted in the moral authority of the Corte costituzionale which needs to be legitimised before the court of public opinion in a constitutional legal order.
At the end of the day, as Alessandro Pizzorusso wrote, in the light of the aforementioned features of the Corte costituzionale, the effectiveness of its precedent from the perspective of the horizontal dimension is quite high 47 . As already mentioned, the Corte di cassazione is tasked with scrutinising whether the judgments of the lower courts have been issued in compliance with legislation and in this way protecting the unity of the interpretation of the law in a legal order. In Italy the On the other hand, as said, the Corte costituzionale is tasked with judging whether a piece of primary legislation is in compliance with the Constitution.
The Coexistence of a Supreme Court and a Constitutional Court in the
Their tasks are different. The interpretation of the law is primarily allocated to the Corte di cassazione; the interpretation of the Constitution is primarily allocated to the Corte costituzionale 49 .
From the perspective of the precedent which matters here, the issue which might arise is the following.
A provision might be constantly interpreted by the courts in a way which becomes diritto vivente (let us call it: norm A). However, a lower court might believe that this It literally means that the Corte costituzionale rejects the challenge (rigetto) and that its decision (decisione) is based on an interpretation of the provision (interpretativa) which has changed (correttiva) from B to A the meaning of the provision given by the lower court. On the other hand, it is very uncommon that the Corte costituzionale agrees with the (ii) In the light of what has been said above about precedent in the Italian legal system, it is not so easy to say when the diritto vivente has been established.
When no diritto vivente is made yet, the Corte costituzionale is freer.
In this case the Corte costituzionale might agree with the lower court, interpret the provision in the way suggested by the court (norm B) and quash it as unconstitutional (decisione di annullamento: a judgment of annulment).
On the contrary, the Corte costituzionale might interpret the provision in a way (norm A) which is in compliance with the Constitution. In such a case, the judgment would be a In order to understand this, it is worth saying a few words on the mechanism which is used by the Corte costituzionale to scrutinise whether a statute is in compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights.
As already said, when the Corte costituzionale review the validity of a statute, it resorts to three main kind of standards (parametro). The norma interposta is one of these. 
Conclusions
One of the aims of this article was describing the express recognitions of the role of precedent in the Italian legal system by examining whether it is effective in the light of the dimensions of the precedent set by Michele Taruffo. In other words, one of the purposes of this article was to analyse, in the light of these dimensions, how effective precedent is in the Italian legal system, under the pieces of legislation and case-law which expressly recognise the role of precedent.
As far as the precedent of the Corte di cassazione, the legislature has tried to expressly recognise the role of precedents with regards to some specific circumstances. However, as precedent in the Italian legal system is so difficult to identify, due to the dimensions analysed by Taruffo, its role is weak, also with regards to those circumstances set out in these provisions.
As the use of precedent by the Corte di cassazione has been already studied in depth by Michele Taruffo, the main scope of the article was analysing the use of precedent by the Italian Constitutional Court.
On the one hand, the Corte costituzionale's approach to its own decisions has been examined, so as to test its effectiveness in the Italian legal order in the light of the dimensions set by Taruffo. As Alessandro Pizzorusso has already written, in the light of some features of the Corte costituzionale, the effectiveness of its precedent in the horizontal dimension is quite high. 
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